The Changing Face of War

Reading for Network Imperialism Paper. Also part of the reading for War & Militarism Module.

Bibliographic Deets

 * Van Creveld, Martin 2005. The Changing Face of War. Presidio Press, California.

Americans in Iraq

 * "Earlier commanders had come with field glasses and maps. Now the most important piece of equipment they carried was a laptop." (247)
 * "Whether on land, at sea, in the air, or in outer space, the real objective of all the electronic wizardry was to enable the Americans to engage in something known as network-centric warfare. 'Network-centric warfare' relie on a whole series of mysterious beings known as ARPANET, MILNET, NSFNET, CAVNET, and any number of other, even more ethereal, nets. ... Among many other marvelous things, it links together no fewer than 134 different government agencies. One objective is to give commanders instantaneous access to any 'lessons' those agencies, in their wisdom, may have to offer." (247)
 * BY COMPARISON: "Iraq is a third-world country with no electronic industry to speak of. At the time it was attacked by the United States, it possessed hardly any weapons younger than fifteen years and even those were suffering from lack of spare parts and maintainence..." (247)


 * "To oppose the US gadgetry, they relied on what one US military historian called 'almost intuitive situational awareness' (meaning, an intimate understanding of the society in which they live). Readily available, portable and cheap, but often highly sophisticated cell phones and other communication devices gave the Iraqi resurgents a 'net-centric' capability of their own." (250).

The First & The Last
Responding to TERRORISM
 * "the core of difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" (269)

( From page 269 )
 * TWO OPTIONS/APRROACHES

1. Intelligence
 * roots out who is who and what they are going to do
 * But must be coupled with professionalism and discipline to prevent continued development of insurgency

2. An Alternative characterized by
 * 1) Preparations highly secretive and disguised
 * 2) Timing must be right -> ACT FAST
 * 3) Strike as hard as possible "beetter to strike too hard than not hard enough"
 * 4) Explain actions thoroughly without apologizing.
 * 5) Have a back-up plan

Epilogue

 * "An army, any army, is only as good as its opponent; fighting the weak, one ends becoming weak." (274)

Part of At Cambridge